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Abstract. This paper explores the compatibility of Luce Irigaray’s recent insistence on the 
need to revalue nature, and to recognise culture’s natural roots, with her earlier advocacy of 
social transformation towards a culture of sexual difference. Prima facie, there is tension 
between Irigaray’s political imperatives, for if culture really is continuous with nature, this 
implies that our existing, non-sexuate, culture is naturally grounded and unchallengeable. To 
dissolve this tension, Irigaray must conceive culture as having self-transformative agency 
without positioning culture as active vis-à-vis an inert and passive nature. I argue that 
Irigaray achieves this by conceiving culture to arise from a division internal to nature. She 
derives this idea from Hölderlin, who claims that nature originally divides itself into subjects 
and objects, and from Heidegger, who maintains that nature inflicts an originary violence 
upon itself. Critically reworking Hölderlin and Heidegger, Irigaray argues that male nature 
tends to turn against itself to generate an anti-natural, ecologically destructive, culture. She 
argues, however, that this tendency can be redirected and alleviated by the very cultural 
resources which male nature generates in dividing itself. Irigaray thus develops a unique way 
to advocate social change while recognising nature’s profound impact and influence upon 
culture.  
 
This paper offers an interpretation of Luce Irigaray’s later philosophical reflections on the 
relation between nature and culture.1 Irigaray is now widely recognised as a thinker of 
change, who seeks social transformation towards a culture of sexual difference, within which 
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femininity and masculinity would share equivalent value and symbolic and civil status.2 In 
her recent work, Irigaray also urges cultural change to recognise the value and fundamental 
importance of nature, and to recognise how profoundly culture is invariably shaped by, and 
dependent upon, nature. She insists that ‘it is from the natural that we should start over in 
order to refound reason’ and that thinking must ‘understand its natural roots and resources’.3 
Yet there appears to be some tension between Irigaray’s political imperatives, for if every 
culture has natural roots, then our current non-sexuate culture must be naturally grounded and 
therefore, presumably, resistant to change. To understand Irigaray’s later thought, and to 
appreciate the continuities within her political and philosophical thinking as a whole, it is 
important to explore how her recent attention to humanity’s dependence upon nature builds 
on, rather than compromises, her earlier insistence on the necessity and possibility of cultural 
change.  
This question is not narrowly relevant to scholars of Irigaray’s thought, but has 
importance for broader debates in feminist philosophy. Contemporary feminist thinkers 
generally agree that western culture and society have a pervasive tendency to devalue and 
denigrate nature relative to culture and to align nature symbolically with femininity, which 
becomes equally devalued. Thus, most feminist thinkers concur that women’s situation can 
be improved only through symbolic and social change to recognise culture’s dependence 
upon, and continuity with, nature. However, if culture truly is continuous with nature, this 
implies that there must be some natural basis for current, patriarchal, culture, and hence that 
this culture cannot readily be changed. This undesirable implication pushes feminists back to 
affirming culture’s independence of, or underdetermination by, nature; yet that affirmation 
threatens to perpetuate women’s symbolic devaluation, insofar as women are aligned with 
nature. Seeking to escape this dilemma, many feminist theorists contest the culture/nature 
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antithesis, suggesting that, although culture has a natural basis, nature is always already 
cultural too.  
For instance, Elizabeth Grosz argues that feminists should neither ignore nature nor 
treat it as a blank slate for cultural inscriptions, but examine how culture and nature 
intertwine.4 She suggests that nature sets limits to cultural possibilities, and that nature 
consists of multiple tendencies and potentialities, which cultures can develop in variable 
ways (VB, 187, 191). Grosz takes etching as a model for this process of cultural 
development, since etching must ‘take into account the specificities of the materials … being 
inscribed and their concrete effects in the kind of text produced’ (VB, 191). Yet Grosz goes 
on to deny that nature has any determinate character prior to cultural development. She 
claims that the natural limits to culture are malleable, because nature’s potentialities are not 
given prior to culture but produced through cultural processes (VB, 188, 227). Ultimately, 
then, Grosz believes that culture interacts only with a nature that is already a cultural artefact. 
In this way, she continues to privilege culture over nature, identifying culture as the 
ontologically basic reality, from which nature derives.5 A more ambiguous assessment of 
nature’s intertwining with culture is provided by Moira Gatens, who argues that there are 
determinate natural tendencies and forces upon which culture builds.6 Although, for Gatens, 
these tendencies are culturally pliable, she suggests that the culture which modifies natural 
tendencies is always given determinate direction by natural forces in their initial form. 
Gatens’ approach promises to allow a more genuine interweaving of nature with culture, yet 
prompts several questions. How far must culture be independent of natural tendencies in 
order to modify them? If culture is independent of those tendencies, then how far do they 
ever really direct it? 
Irigaray’s later philosophy provides answers to these questions, suggesting that 
culture has agency vis-à-vis nature only because culture arises from an internal division 
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within nature itself. She supports this suggestion with a unique and complex conception of 
the nature/culture relationship which arises from her engagement with Heidegger and, 
ultimately, with the German Romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin. In tracing how Irigaray 
elaborates this conception, I will begin by examining her critique of patriarchal culture’s 
hostility to nature in Thinking the Difference (1989). Irigaray argues that this culture stems 
from men’s naturally destructive tendencies, and, to explain how patriarchal culture can be 
both anti-natural and rooted in nature, she suggests that this culture emerges in a movement 
whereby nature turns against itself. As I hope to show, Irigaray derives this intriguing idea 
from Hölderlin’s view that nature originally divides itself (which Heidegger rewrites as the 
view that nature inflicts violence upon itself, although here I shall focus principally on 
Hölderlin, as the originator of this entire line of thought concerning nature). Modifying 
Hölderlin, Irigaray argues that male nature tends to turn against itself, but that this tendency 
can be overcome through the very cultural resources which (male) nature generates in its self-
division.7 Thus, Irigaray advocates cultural change to transform nature’s originally self-
destructive tendencies, but since she conceives culture as natural, she avoids reproducing the 
masculinism of the traditional culture/nature hierarchy. Her later thought can thus make a 
valuable contribution to feminist reflection on nature and culture by understanding cultural 
change as compatible with renewed recognition of, and esteem for, nature.   
 
1. Nature and culture in Irigaray’s Thinking the Difference 
Irigaray does not explicitly set out her novel conception of the nature/culture relationship, but 
it is implicit in several of her later texts, most notably the essay ‘A Chance to Live’ in 
Thinking the Difference and the chapter of To Be Two (1994) entitled ‘Between Us, a 
Fabricated World’. Whereas her discussion of nature and culture in the latter text is mediated 
through readings of Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Sophocles, the earlier text is couched in a 
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more popular style (originally presented as a talk to the Italian Communist Party). Yet, in 
addition to popularising Irigaray’s earlier ideas, Thinking the Difference outlines a unique 
approach to the relation between nature and culture. Irigaray’s burgeoning interest in this 
theme stems from her concern at the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, which galvanised her to 
reflect on the ecological dangers posed by a culture that is (in some sense) severed from 
nature. 
Irigaray begins by pointing to a widespread cultural unease which, she thinks, has 
crystallised around Chernobyl. Prior to Chernobyl, one could imagine that nature would 
regulate and alleviate the ill-effects of human activities. But, Irigaray rather oddly claims, ‘at 
Chernobyl, nature turned out to be a vehicle of greater destruction than any war’ (TD, 3). She 
adds that this destruction stemmed from a ‘combination of … artificial pollution and natural 
phenomena: hails, storms, even sun’ (4). These claims are puzzling: surely Chernobyl was a 
thoroughly human-made disaster? Irigaray seems to believe that the destructiveness of the 
event was so great – that ‘the cultural disorder into which we are being drawn … has become 
[so] intolerable’ – as to draw nature itself into the same destructive cycle that characterises 
human culture. Ultimately, then, Irigaray regards Chernobyl as reflecting the deeper-lying 
problem that western culture is fundamentally destructive, towards nature particularly. 
Irigaray maintains that this destructiveness reflects the fact that western culture has been 
created by and for men.8 She writes: ‘This warlike method of organizing society is not self-
evident. Its origin is patriarchal. It is sexuate [sexuée]’ (5) – or, as she later states, ‘society … 
has certain characteristics which pass for universal but are in fact attributable to the sex of the 
people that compose it’ (17).  
Irigaray goes on to claim that this masculine or patriarchal culture evinces a 
preoccupation with death and destruction while persistently neglecting, and failing to reflect 
upon, the primary importance for all human beings of their birth and dependency upon their 
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mothers in early infancy.9 She then enumerates some further features of patriarchal culture – 
its suppression of mother-daughter relationships10 and its tendency to deny women legal 
rights – but the fundamental task generated by her opening analysis is to explain in what way 
the destructiveness of western culture reflects its specifically masculine character. Her 
explanation unfolds in two stages.  
Firstly, Irigaray suggests that patriarchal culture has its roots in the particular 
difficulties of male infants in negotiating separation from their mothers (separation in the 
dual sense of birth and of the gradual process of becoming independent and forming a 
separate sense of self). According to Irigaray, this process of separation is inescapably painful 
for all infants – she speaks of the ‘the losses and scars involved in the separations from that 
first home … The wound we cannot heal, and cannot cure, is the cutting of the umbilical 
cord’ (SG, 16). But, for boys, this separation is especially painful, because boys are 
overwhelmingly aware of their sexual difference from their mothers. In contrast, girls 
experience themselves as being of the same sex as their mothers – as Irigaray puts it: 
‘Woman … immediately becomes a subject in relation to another subject who is the same as 
she: her mother’ (TD, 19). Consequently, girls face the rather different difficulty of learning 
to combine their shared sexual identity with a resilient sense of individual difference from 
their mothers.11 Boys, for their part, have an immediate experience of sexual difference, 
which is painful because it makes the loss of their mothers much more profound. Irigaray 
clarifies this later on in Thinking the Difference: ‘the son does not know how to situate 
himself in regard to the person who engendered him with no possible reciprocity. He cannot 
conceive in himself … The situation is different for the daughter, who is potentially mother’ 
(TD, 110-111).  
Irigaray develops the same point more fully in an interview for Hypatia: 
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The relation of the little boy to his mother is different from the little girl’s 
relation. The little boy, in order to situate himself vis-à-vis the mother, must 
have a strategy, … because he finds himself in an extremely difficult situation. 
He’s a little boy. He has come out of a woman who’s different from him. He 
himself will never be able to engender, to give birth. He is therefore in a space of 
unfathomable mystery. He must invent a strategy to keep himself from being 
submerged, engulfed. For the little girl it’s entirely different. She’s a little 
woman born of another woman. She is able to engender like her mother (JLI, 
107-108). 
Girls, then, can adapt to losing their mothers because they experience themselves as having 
the same corporeal abilities as their mothers, which ensures some continuity. Lacking this 
experience, boys must adopt a variety of coping strategies. Chief among these is to deny or 
disavow ever being dependent upon, or closely imbricated with, their mothers. This denial 
forces boys to disavow, in turn, their own corporeality, which bears testimony to dependency 
and finitude. Irigaray calls this whole strategy the ‘murder’ of the mother – not (usually) a 
literal murder, but an attitude of denying the mother’s significance, and even existence, at a 
symbolic level.12 Underneath this murderous attitude lingers a fantasy of fusion with and 
proximity to the mother, a fantasy which boys/men never relinquish (precisely because they 
never acknowledge it), and which surreptitiously invades and blights all their relations with 
women. 
Irigaray’s account of male difficulties in separating from the mother might be thought 
to rely on the implausible view that boys cannot tolerate separation from their mothers 
because they know that they will never be able to give birth (whereas girls know that they 
will be able to). This is implausible both because some girls will never be able to give birth 
and because young children are reasonably thought to lack knowledge of their future 
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reproductive abilities. However, Irigaray fundamentally understands the ability (and inability) 
to give birth as functions of women’s (and men’s) distinctive rhythms, the distinctive 
temporal patterns which govern the development of their experience and capacities (TD, 114-
115).13 Thus, the sexual difference that boys experience is the difference between their 
rhythm and that of their mothers, where boys’ particular rhythm structures and pervades their 
experience without them having any (conceptual) knowledge of what this rhythm is or 
signifies. If there genuinely are differences between sexuate rhythms as Irigaray believes, 
then it is plausible to think that boys will experience their own rhythm as different from that 
of their mothers, and that this experience must aggravate existing difficulties with separation. 
Moreover, boys’/men’s resultant strategy of symbolically murdering the mother can be 
expected to engender a destructive culture because, much of the time, boys/men will seek to 
negate and erase whatever is corporeal and natural. Boys/men will let this destructiveness 
persist unchecked because they remain trapped in a fantasy according to which the natural, 
corporeal, and (by association) maternal remains ever-present and indestructible (precisely 
that collective fantasy which Irigaray sees as threatened by the severity of the Chernobyl 
disaster). 
Thinking the Difference offers an additional account of how western cultural 
destructiveness is masculine: this culture is rooted in male sexuality, which, Irigaray claims, 
obeys a different pattern to female sexuality, that of ‘tension, release and return to 
homoeostasis’ (TD, 21). She maintains that this sexuality impels men to engage in destructive 
modes of behaviour that seek to raise tensions to breaking point. Irigaray finds this reflected, 
especially, in modern technology, which (in its incessant noise, for example) intrudes 
disrespectfully upon the natural rhythms of human bodies. Notably, Irigaray’s analysis of 
male sexuality implies that it generates practices and technologies which operate 
detrimentally to other elements of male embodiment. It appears that, for Irigaray, male 
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corporeality turns against itself, some aspects of this corporeality perpetrating violence upon 
others. 
Potentially problematically, Irigaray appears to assume that male sexuality has a 
determinate character independently of any cultural mediation. We should bear in mind, 
though, that Irigaray again regards male sexuality as a function of men’s distinctive rhythm. 
In this way, she understands sexual difference not primarily as biological but as a difference 
in men’s and women’s being – where being is not an entity, but the process of emergence of 
abilities, forms of experience, and anatomical structures, a process which differs between the 
sexes in respect of its temporal rhythm.14 For Irigaray, this difference in sexuate being exists 
naturally. Following the later Heidegger, Irigaray thinks of being both as the event or process 
through which entities emerge, and as ultimately identical with nature (reconceived according 
to its original Greek definition as physis).15 Irigaray does, therefore, believe in natural 
differences between men and women, existing prior to any cultural mediation. But this is not 
mere naïvety on her part, and involves no uncritical acceptance of the discourse of biology. 
Rather, Irigaray believes in natural differences according to a distinctively philosophical 
reconception of nature. This philosophical reconception of nature informs her understanding 
of the nature/culture relationship in Thinking the Difference, which we can now begin to draw 
out. 
Irigaray believes that male nature has generated a culture which opposes itself to 
nature, including to female bodies and to male bodies qua natural. There is, then, a part of 
nature – the male sex – which turns against itself. Western culture arises in this turning of 
(the male part of) nature against itself, thereby acquiring the enduring form of an anti-natural, 
ecologically damaging, culture. Irigaray’s derivation of key features of western culture from 
male nature thus forms part of a careful attempt to avoid reifying culture as something 
independent of nature, and to understand culture, instead, as an internal torsion within the 
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natural. This intriguing reconceptualisation of culture – and, concomitantly, of nature as self-
opposing – remains only implicit in Irigaray’s analysis of destructive culture in Thinking the 
Difference, but it becomes relatively explicit in To Be Two. 
In the latter text, Irigaray opens her consideration of nature and culture by quoting the 
choral song from Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone which begins (in the translation she uses): 
‘There is much that is uncanny, but nothing that surpasses man in uncanniness’. Heidegger is 
Irigaray’s primary interlocutor here: he discusses this chorus in his 1935 lecture course 
Introduction to Metaphysics, to which Irigaray is critically responding.16 However, in the 
background to her response is a further level of engagement with Friedrich Hölderlin, whose 
thinking about humanity centrally informs Heidegger’s discussion of Sophocles. Although 
Hölderlin is not, in general, an obvious interlocutor of Irigaray’s, references to him occur 
sporadically throughout her oeuvre; in This Sex Which Is Not One, she proposed to teach a 
history of readings of Antigone, including that of Hölderlin, who translated this drama.17 
Moreover, Irigaray is aware of Heidegger’s debt to Hölderlin, so that her response to 
Heidegger inevitably encompasses Hölderlin as well. To understand Irigaray’s consideration 
of the nature/culture relation in To Be Two, then, we must first gain an overview of 
Hölderlin’s speculations on this topic.18 We can then explore how these speculations 
influence Heidegger, and how Irigaray eventually responds to both thinkers. 
 
2. Hölderlin, nature, and the human  
Hölderlin’s thinking about nature arose in the context of early German Romanticism, which 
aspired to overcome the modern disenchantment of nature by producing art which would re-
infuse nature with ‘beauty, magic and mystery’.19 Hölderlin became increasingly critical of 
this project of re-enchanting nature through art, which he came to find anthropocentric, 
presupposing the same separation between humanity and nature that it purported to 
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overcome. Hölderlin’s increasingly critical attitude to Romanticism reveals his deepening 
conviction that humanity’s very separation from nature arises through a natural process – 
humanity being merely the site where nature turns against itself. This conviction of 
Hölderlin’s becomes crucial for Heidegger and, in turn, Irigaray.  
Hölderlin’s thinking about humanity’s status within nature represents the progressive 
working out of his early theoretical reflections on nature, especially those contained in his 
crucial early fragment ‘Judgement and Being’. Here Hölderlin argues that all consciousness 
involves the subject relating to objects via judgement, through which it distinguishes these 
objects from itself. For Hölderlin, consciousness as a subject-object relation necessarily 
presupposes a prior unity of subject and object, a unity which is no mere synthesis but an 
absolute unification which precedes any distinction. This unity is, he states, ‘Being [which] 
expresses the combination of subject and object. Where subject and object are directly, not 
just partially, united, … there and nowhere else can there be talk of being as such’.20 
However, this ‘blessed unity, being’ cannot be known.21 We cannot be conscious of being, 
because all consciousness requires experience of objects from which we differentiate 
ourselves as subjects – a differentiation which is absent within being. Insofar as we are 
conscious, judging subjects, being is lost to us. Now, unitary being, Hölderlin also maintains, 
is nature. He equates original being with nature because he relies on the ancient Greek 
understanding of nature as physis, that which ‘loves to hide’.22 Because being is always 
disappearing, receding behind the separation between objects and subjects, being can be said 
to ‘love to hide’, and so can be identified with nature. As J. M. Bernstein sums up, ‘nature as 
the ground of the human cannot appear because it would have to be judged, but if judged, 
then it is already in a state of dispersion’.23 We can experience nature only as the realm of 
objects standing over against us, but cannot experience that prior nature which is united with 
us; as conscious, we have always already lost that originary nature.  
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Through this analysis, Hölderlin identifies the disenchantment of nature as an 
inescapable consequence of reflection, where reflectiveness itself is an ineluctable 
concomitant of human consciousness. As his character Hyperion laments, ‘an instant of 
reflection hurls me down. I reflect, and … the world in its eternal oneness is gone; nature 
closes her arms, and I stand like an alien before her and do not understand her’.24 For 
Hölderlin, our conscious reflectiveness as humans marks us out as distinctively cultural, 
historical, beings, who are inherently estranged from nature. Despite the fact that nature is 
therefore unknowable for us, Hölderlin believes that we retain some sense of it as our basis 
and origin, for which we are always nostalgic. Consciousness, separation, and reflection 
presuppose an original unity of which we necessarily retain some vestigial awareness. This 
awareness impels us to strive to reunite with nature – ‘To reunite ourselves with nature, with 
a unique infinite totality, is the goal of all our strivings’.25  
From the later 1790s onwards, Hölderlin developed his thoughts on human separation 
from nature by theorising ancient Greek tragedy. ‘The significance of tragedies’ (1802) 
conceives the tragic hero as compelled to reunite with nature: Empedocles, for example, 
sought unity with nature and eventually flung himself into Mount Etna to achieve it. 
However, in drafting and redrafting his own tragedy The Death of Empedocles, Hölderlin 
came to identify two possible responses to separation from nature. The first, Greek, response 
– that of Empedocles – is to dissolve the self and die. The second response is the ‘Hesperian’, 
which defines western Europe after the decline of classical Greece, and which accepts the 
living death of separation from nature.26 Hölderlin came to see the Hesperian response as 
more appropriate, finding the Greek attitude hubristic, premised on an inflated assessment of 
humanity’s status within the cosmos. Hölderlin never systematically argues for the Hesperian 
response, but we can reconstruct why it becomes appropriate given the logic of his earlier 
thinking concerning nature. 
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If humanity is originally wholly one with nature, then their separation cannot arise 
from any activity on the part of humanity just as such. This separation must arise from nature, 
with which humanity is initially united. Nature must divide itself – into humanity on one side, 
and an objectified derivative of itself on the other. To construe ourselves, human beings, as 
responsible for this division is to presume our capacity to act independently of nature as a 
whole – when in fact, Hölderlin says, ‘all the … streams of human activity … have their 
source in nature’.27 From Hölderlin’s perspective, then, it must be inappropriate for humanity 
to attempt to overcome separation (whether through suicide or artistic projects of re-
enchantment). To suppose that humanity can overcome separation is to assume that humanity 
can act independently of nature (so as to oppose the self-division which nature has initiated). 
Even though all striving for unity is a striving to dissolve one’s humanity, this striving 
remains, ultimately, premised upon anthropocentric assumptions. In fact, according to 
Hölderlin’s thinking, we have become separated from nature by its power alone, so it is not 
within our power to undo separation.28 The appropriately modest response is to recognise our 
dependence and hence to endure separation – to wait, patiently, until nature may change its 
mode of being. Humanity, Hölderlin increasingly comes to believe, must undergo the 
suffering of division from nature. 
Having previously positioned humanity as distinctly non- or anti-natural, Hölderlin 
increasingly draws out how nature persists within the non-naturalness of humanity. For 
Hölderlin, humanity is non-natural just because it is the place where nature divides itself, 
splits within itself. The human condition of opposition to nature is inflicted upon humanity by 
nature. Hölderlin thus understands humanity as naturally non-natural, reciprocally 
conceiving nature as self-opposing, self-dividing. This understanding of humanity may be 
characterised as thoroughly non-anthropocentric, in that it traces even humanity’s anti-
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natural, cultural, proclivities back to (self-dividing) nature. This thoroughly non-
anthropocentric view of humanity becomes decisive for Heidegger and Irigaray. 
 
3. Irigaray’s response to Hölderlin and Heidegger 
In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger comments on the choral ode to Sophocles’ 
Antigone while discussing the essence of the human. He aims to return to the original, ancient 
Greek, definition of human being, a poetic definition which he finds expressed in the writings 
of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and in Antigone. Heidegger takes as Antigone’s central definition 
that humanity is to deinotaton, which he translates as the ‘most uncanny’ (Unheimlichste). 
Humanity is singularly uncanny because it is the point at which nature (as physis) divides 
against itself. Although Heidegger does not mention Hölderlin at this point in the lecture 
course, Hölderlin’s understanding of the human is evidently in the background  – especially 
since Heidegger refers earlier to Hölderlin’s unsurpassed understanding of ‘the great age of 
Greek beginnings’.29 Nonetheless, Heidegger departs from Hölderlin in giving central place 
to humanity’s violence (Gewalt), as we will see. 
Heidegger begins by exploring the Greek concept of deinon, translated as uncanny or 
terrible. Firstly, being or physis is uncanny because it is irreducible to beings (it is the event 
of their emergence which, preceding all beings, cannot be properly said to ‘be’). Heidegger 
also describes being in its emergent, eruptive, character as violent, as the ‘overwhelming 
sway’ (überwältigende Walten). Humanity derives from physis and, as such, is violent too. 
However, humanity is distinguished in being violent towards the rest of the beings that 
emerge physically: humanity (as Sophocles tells us) intrudes violently into sea and earth, 
forcibly tames and exploits animals, and, above all, masters beings as a whole by imposing 
intelligibility upon them. Humanity, then, is the place at which the violence of physis turns 
upon itself, which makes humanity the most uncanny. As Susan Schoenbohm explains 
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Heidegger’s thought: ‘As human, the violent is a power of physis, … indeed, the power of 
physis, which uses violence against itself; that the overwhelming sway turns against itself 
characterises the power of physis’.30 Whereas Hölderlin focused on humanity’s separation 
from nature without defining this separation as per se violent, Heidegger foregrounds the 
violence both of physis and of humanity towards other beings. He envisions humanity as 
destined to actively struggle with other beings (primarily through the intellectual and poetic 
struggle to wrest intelligibility from them). 
Heidegger also stresses that humanity is destined to misunderstand its violent powers 
as manifesting its independent agency (when in fact, these powers are really powers of 
physis). In ‘his’ very resourcefulness and violence, the human being cannot but mistake ‘the 
power which pervades him, which alone enables him to be a man’ (IM, 156) for a power that 
‘he’ has somehow brought about through his own resources. But because, in fact, humanity’s 
power derives from physis, humanity is destined to be defeated by physis in its struggle 
against it. Each human being, then, must die; through death, there occurs a closing up of the 
‘breach’ within being that humanity represents (124). However, Heidegger suggests the 
possibility of embracing one’s death, by actively wrestling against nature while knowing that 
the struggle is doomed. Whereas Hölderlin counselled acceptance of our limits, Heidegger 
urges violence towards the beings of nature; he cannot at this point concede the worth of any 
non-violent ways of relating to other physical beings.31  
Heidegger’s emphasis on violence enables Irigaray to connect Hölderlin’s conception 
of humanity’s place in nature with her analysis of western destructiveness and its specifically 
masculine character. ‘Between Us, a Fabricated World’ largely adopts Irigaray’s well-known 
mimetic style, beginning by quoting the Sophoclean ode and then paraphrasing portions of 
Heidegger’s commentary upon it. Irigaray writes, ‘Man upsets the rhythm of natural growth. 
He plows the earth and obliges it to produce by force what it does not yield on its own … 
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Man imposes a yoke upon the life that unfolds in itself but whose foundations he does not 
inhabit’ (TBT, 69). Man is the inquiétante being who breaks out of the nature to which he 
was originally enslaved and dominates it, instituting a second, cultural and historical, world 
(70). Following Heidegger, Irigaray adds that man becomes ‘exiled’ and ‘estranged’ from his 
being in this cultural world, inevitably coming to identify himself as the creator of this entire 
sphere, when, ‘in fact, he has only imitated the strength of the universe which surrounds him 
… man’s mastery resembles the natural strength with which he wishes to measure himself’. 
His strength and violence are really that of nature, operating through him.  
Besides paraphrasing Heidegger, Irigaray distances herself subtly from him (and, 
indirectly, from Hölderlin) by highlighting the sexually differentiated nature of the humanity 
through whom nature enacts violence upon itself. At first, she uses Heidegger’s language of 
‘man’ mimetically, but, as her essay unfolds, she marks increasingly firmly that male 
humanity is in question, not humans per se. Thus, she states that the violence of culture ‘can 
be explained beginning from a masculine subjectivity’ (TBT, 76). She also writes that: 
The feminine is not called to carry out the task of constructing a world which is 
similar to man’s: a violent, uncanny world, which exists through the domination 
of nature … To … cultivate herself without violence or power over what 
surrounds her – all of these correspond more to feminine being. (72)  
Irigaray suggests that men are violent due to their special difficulty in accepting sexual 
difference: ‘man chooses to ignore this irreducible difference … Is this not because he feels 
foreign to this life which lives without him, this life which reproduces itself … ?’ (70) Or, as 
she states later on, man’s violence is ‘probably related to man’s relationship with the one who 
generates him: he will never generate in himself and must fabricate things outside of himself, 
in order to separate himself from the mother; he must manufacture externally, while she 
generates internally’ (76). For Irigaray (drawing on her earlier analysis in Thinking the 
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Difference), it is men’s difficulty in accepting sexual difference which leads them to turn 
against women, and, simultaneously, against the nature of which they themselves are part – 
as when men engineer technologies which damage their own nature. 
While Irigaray agrees with Hölderlin and Heidegger that nature turns against itself, 
she holds that only males mediate this turn. Man’s, but not woman’s, nature is to be uncanny 
and violent. Through men’s activities, women become embroiled in a non-natural mode of 
life that is fundamentally alien to them. Evidently, Irigaray can only identify men as the sole 
mediators of nature’s violence because she believes in an original sexual differentiation 
within nature (against which men, as one pole of this differentiation, react). This contrasts 
with Hölderlin’s view of nature as original, absolute, unity. Believing in an originary 
differentiation, Irigaray understands male violence to consist, typically, in the forcible 
imposition of sameness upon women and other natural beings. Hölderlin, on the other hand, 
conceives humans as separated from nature insofar as their power of judgement leads them to 
divide, analyse, and reflectively partition natural beings. But for Irigaray, Hölderlin’s 
conception of nature as primordially unitary instantiates the same disavowal of sexual 
difference which underpins male hostility to nature. By denying originary difference, 
Hölderlin’s account of nature becomes complicit with the very separation from nature that he 
wishes to question.32  
Irigaray’s belief in an originary sexual differentiation makes nature’s turning against 
itself considerably less mysterious than it is for Hölderlin. The opening up of a division 
within primordial unity must necessarily be a mysterious event, since this unity itself contains 
no grounds for diremption. In contrast, Irigaray’s analyses in To Be Two and Thinking the 
Difference make it quite intelligible why the male pole of a pre-existing differentiation should 
turn, reactively, against (the rest of) nature. One might object that there remains a mystery as 
to how nature originally becomes sexually dual: that is, that Irigaray has simply pushed the 
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mysterious event of division back to reside in the movement whereby sexual difference 
naturally emerges. However, although Irigaray does regard sexual difference as mysterious, 
she locates its mystery precisely in its irreducibility to any prior unity (TBT, 111). 
To Be Two deepens Irigaray’s earlier analysis of male destructiveness, understanding 
the male sex as the place where nature enacts violence upon itself. Male violence – and 
patriarchal culture, with its separation from and hostility to nature – derive from a nature 
understood, philosophically, both as sexually differentiated and as effecting a violent turn 
against itself. Irigaray does not, then, regard patriarchal culture as natural in the sense of 
grounding it, uncritically, in biology. By drawing from Hölderlin and Heidegger an unusual 
conception of nature as self-dividing, she avoids naïve biologism, but simultaneously avoids 
reifying culture as a separate, independent, sphere. Yet, in arguing that destructive culture 
arises naturally, must not Irigaray construe this culture as unchangeable? Intriguingly, given 
her emphasis upon culture’s natural roots, she insists throughout To Be Two that patriarchal 
culture can be changed. Let us explore this dimension of her thought. 
 
4. The place of nature in the culture of sexual difference 
Irigaray stresses that western violence represents only one possible cultural direction, an 
alternative having been taken in ‘the Far East’. More specifically, she suggests that men 
could learn to cultivate respect for the sexually different other, and for other natural beings. 
Men could practise ‘self-mastery’ (TBT, 172) – self-restraint in the face of their desire to act 
violently and deny difference. Yet how is this attitudinal change possible, if – as Irigaray has 
maintained – men just are the site through which nature turns upon itself? Irigaray explains 
that: ‘The fact that [man’s] impulses, inclinations and desires are violent does not necessarily 
mean that this is an inherent part of masculine being, but that violence can come from an 
historical construction’ (71). Likewise, in Thinking the Difference, she maintains that men’s 
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destructiveness stems from the absence of a ‘sexual culture, a (partially dialectical) pattern of 
cultural relations between the genders [genres]’ (TD, 17). But if, after all, patriarchal culture 
explains masculine psychical difficulties, then what explains the formation and tenacity of 
patriarchal culture? 
Irigaray’s apparently contradictory statements regarding the contributions of nature 
and culture to male violence can be reconciled if she believes that men have only a natural 
tendency to violence. If so, then male violence is not inevitable, because men’s destructive 
tendency will be activated or exercised only if a set of appropriate conditions is met. 
Moreover, contextual factors invariably affect how any tendency exercises itself, so that its 
manifestation is always socially and culturally mediated, in complex, unpredictable, ways. 
Thus, Irigaray need not envisage a linear causal relationship between masculine violence and 
a destructive culture. Rather, men’s violent tendencies will become activated in the absence 
of a sexuate culture, an absence which leaves men without resources to comprehend and 
acclimatise to sexual difference. The little boy finds himself in a space of unfathomable 
mystery only because his culture, which is non-sexuate, deprives him of ways to make sense 
of his mother’s difference from himself. If femininity were instead recognised as an 
independent identity, and masculinity were recognised as a correspondingly specific identity 
with virtues and values of its own, then the difficulty of sexual difference would become 
negotiable.  
Yet how can culture, which is only the effect of nature’s tendency to turn against 
itself, ever affect the natural tendency from which it results? Irigaray’s answer is that culture 
arises as something genuinely non-natural through nature’s turn against itself, a non-
naturalness that enables culture to act back upon the nature that sustains it. Here Irigaray 
denies that she is falling back onto the traditional idea that culture is independent of nature – 
for her, the anti-naturalness of culture itself arises naturally. Moreover, she also insists that a 
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sexuate culture would not oppose nature’s self-opposing tendencies altogether (which would, 
after all, be self-contradictory, for then this culture would effectively cancel itself out). 
Rather, a sexuate culture would cultivate natural tendencies – transforming them and 
orienting them in a new, relatively benign, direction. In particular, this culture would redirect 
men’s oppositional tendencies – their ‘negativity’ – against themselves, so as to install within 
them a permanent check against their own destructiveness, and a stimulant to respect for the 
other and for nature.33  
For Irigaray, then, the violent, anti-natural, character of western culture has arisen 
through our own – cultural – failure to redirect nature’s tendency to turn against itself. A 
sexuate culture could counteract this tendency and push it towards a new respect for alterity. 
Whereas Hölderlin counsels us to wait patiently for possible change in nature’s own mode of 
being, Irigaray urges that we – as human, cultural, beings – should intervene to reorientate 
nature’s self-destructive tendency. In these divergent recommendations, Hölderlin and 
Irigaray might at first sight appear to occupy the two poles of the dilemma with which I 
opened this paper, over whether or not we should affirm that culture has natural foundations. 
Hölderlin denies culture any independence of nature, but consequently espouses quietism. 
Irigaray advocates cultural change, but would therefore seem obliged to grant culture some 
independent agency with respect to nature. Yet she avoids making that move: although she 
allows culture the agency to transform and cultivate nature, she does so without conceiving 
culture as independent of nature, instead reconceiving it as dependent on nature for its 
agency. This agency arises naturally, through internal division within nature. Irigaray treats 
nature as the ontologically basic element within the culture/nature dyad, distancing herself 
from the masculinist tradition which typically devalues nature, depicting it as secondary to 
the cultural, spiritual, realm. Irigaray thereby succeeds in combining a consistent refusal of 
the masculinist nature/culture hierarchy with advocacy of cultural change. Her thought thus 
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dissolves feminist philosophy’s dilemma, opening up a way for feminists to combine support 
for cultural change with commitment to securing renewed recognition and esteem for nature. 
In highlighting these unique strengths of Irigaray’s philosophy of sexual difference, I 
do not mean to suggest that it is without problems. Her conception of the nature/culture 
relation relies on her belief in natural sexual difference, which she regards as fundamentally 
real in a way that racial and ethnic differences are not (ILTY, 47). Her understanding of 
natural sexual difference is also, arguably, heteronormative, implying a natural attraction 
between the two sexes.34 Nonetheless, I believe that these problems could be most 
productively addressed by starting from and transforming, rather than rejecting, Irigaray’s 
fruitful conception of the nature/culture relation. I hope that this paper has shown that this 
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